

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE  
CIVIL JURISDICTION

BETWEEN:

SHAIRAZ ALI

Plaintiff

-and-

1. VIOLET BAPTISTE
2. GARFIELD STRANS
3. GUY GOLD INC., a company incorporated under the Companies Act, No. 29 of 1991 with its registered office at Lot 7 North Road, Bourda.

Defendants  
Jointly & Severally

The Honourable Justice Navindra A. Singh, Puisne Judge

Messrs. Sohan Poonai and Rajendra Poonai S.C. for the Plaintiff

Mr. Neil Boston S.C. for the Defendants

**Delivered March 19<sup>th</sup> 2021**

DECISION

The Plaintiff claims that he holds Lease No. A12158 [**Exhibit “H1 - H5”**], issued by the Government of Guyana on March 31<sup>st</sup> 2006, for certain lands known as and situate at Parcels 914, 915, 916, **917** and **936**; Block VII; Zone Right Bank Essequibo River.

The Plaintiff claims that on August 8<sup>th</sup> 2010, the Defendants constructed a fence blocking him from occupying the said Parcels of lands.

The Defendants contend that Mark Levy is the owner of Parcel 917 by virtue of Certificate of Title No. 83/ 473 dated June 11<sup>th</sup> 1983 [**Exhibit “T”**] and he, Mark Levy, permitted them to enter the said Parcel.

The Defendants contend that the Third Named Defendant [TND] was given possession of the said Parcel 917 under an Agreement of Sale and Purchase dated May 20<sup>th</sup> 2010 between the TND and Mark Levy [**Exhibit “V1 - V2”**].

The Defendants contend that Parcel 917 was owned by Tyrell August Levy by virtue of Transport No. 1457 of 1957 [**Exhibit “U1 - U3”**] and by virtue of a First Registration of that Transport under the Land Registry Act, Mark Levy became the owner of Parcel 917 by virtue of Certificate of Title No. 83/ 473 [**Exhibit “T”**].

The Defendants further contend that Parcel 936 is subject to public rights as recognised by **section 4 (4) of the Civil Law of Guyana Act; CAP 6:01** of the Laws of Guyana.

The Plaintiff asserts that Parcel 917 is part of the foreshore of the Essequibo River and Parcel 936 is the Sea Defence Reserve Dam and therefore both Parcels are State Lands and incapable of private ownership.

The Plaintiff asserts that in these circumstances, with respect to Parcel 917, Certificate of Title No. 83/ 473 was issued in error and therefore not valid.

The Plaintiff claims, *inter alia*, a Declaration that by virtue of Lease No. A12158 he is entitled to the occupation and possession of the Parcels therein and an injunction restraining the Defendants from trespassing upon the said Parcels.

## **ISSUE I**

Is Parcel 917; Block VII; Zone Right Bank Essequibo River, State Land.

## **FACTS**

Parcels 909 - 1700 Block VII; Zone Right Bank Essequibo River are shown on Plan No. 15526 dated August 1<sup>st</sup> 1972 [**Exhibit “A”**] which Plan was surveyed and paled off under **section 21 of the Land Registry Ordinance No. 18 of 1959.**

The Plaintiff and the Defendants have accepted the validity of Plan No. 15526.

The Plaintiff testified that he applied to the Lands and Surveys Department for a lease to the land in 1993 and this is evidenced by correspondence dated February 22<sup>nd</sup> 1994 from the Lands and Surveys Department [**Exhibit “C”**].

The Plaintiff also testified that he received permission to construct a wharf at Parika, East Bank Essequibo from the Transport & Harbours Department and the Sea Defence Board in 1994 [**Exhibits “D” and “E”**].

A copy of Plan No. 29891 drawn by SLS M. S. Azam and dated March 29<sup>th</sup> 2000, which is referred to in Lease No. A12158 was tendered into the evidence [**Exhibit “G”**] though not for the truth of the contents since the original could apparently not be located. It is noted nevertheless that Plan No. 29891 displays materially the same information with respect to Parcels 917 and 936 as Plan No. 15526.

The Plaintiff testified that since the issuance of Lease No. A12158 he has been paid the annual rental for Parcel 917 to the Lands and Surveys Commission without fail and tendered receipts to support this testimony [**Exhibits “J1 - J33”**].

Based on the evidence the Plaintiff deposited boulders on Parcel 917, covered it with sand and mud and subsequently dumped several tons of mud on Parcel 917.

The Judge visited the area on March 13<sup>th</sup> 2021 and the Plaintiff, the SND and Joan Straughn were present.

During that visit, the Plaintiff, the SND and Joan Straughn all pointed to what they referred to as the sea dam and it is the same portion of land described as Parcel 936 on the Plans.

They also pointed to what they consider to be Parcel 917 and it is the same portion of land described as Parcel 917 on the Plans. In addition they all pointed into the Essequibo River as being the northern boundary of Parcel 917, in fact Joan Straughn pointed to beyond a sea vessel moored in the river.

## **LAW**

**Sea Defence Act; CAP 64:02** of the Laws of Guyana.

**Section 2** provides;

*“sea defence” includes -*

- (a) any dam, concrete, stone, timber, or other wall, groyne, koker run, or any construction whatever, constructed or used by the Board as a protection fo the sea coast or river banks against the erosive action of the sea or river current;*
- (b) the bed of the sea, river, creek or canal whereon there is or is built any structure under paragraph (a).*
- (c) all land fifty feet landwards from the centre of any sea or river dam or sea or wall under paragraph (a), and all land on the other side of such sea or river*

*dam or sea or river wall in the direction of the sea or river to the toe of such sea or river dam or sea or river wall;*

*(d) any shell bank or reef, mud bank or reef, sand bank or reef, or other natural feature, which serves as a protection of the sea coast against the erosive action of the sea or which protects the bank of any river from the erosive action of the river current; and*

*(e) all land fifty feet landward of the crest or top of any reef, bank or natural feature under paragraph (d) hereof, and all land on the other side thereof in the direction of the sea or river as far as the mean high water mark;*

**Section 12 (1)** provides;

*All sea defences which are or shall be in existence in any district shall by force of this Act become the property of the State.*

**Civil Law of Guyana Act; CAP 6:01** of the Laws of Guyana.

**Section 2 (1)** provides;

*From and after 1<sup>st</sup> January 1917, hereinafter in this Act referred to as “the date aforesaid” ...*

**Section 4 (1)** provides;

*From and after the date aforesaid, the foreshore of Guyana (that is to say, the part of the shore of the sea and the tidal navigable rivers which is covered by the medium high tide between the spring tides and the neap tides), the soil under tidal waters, and the sea-bed within the territorial waters of Guyana (hereafter in this section called “the land”), shall be deemed to be State lands and may be dealt with in the*

*same manner in which State lands are now dealt with under the State Lands Act or under any later Act.*

**Section 4 (7)** provides;

*Nothing in this section contained shall be construed as vesting in the State any land forming part of the foreshore or a sea-bed over which a private right has been established by virtue of any law or custom and whether by prescription or otherwise.*

### **ANALYSIS**

Based on the undisputed facts, particularly Plan No. 15526 [**Exhibit “A”**] and the actual identification and description of the lands to the Judge by the Plaintiff, the SND and Joan Straughn Parcel 936 is irrefutably a sea/ river dam and therefore “**sea defence**” as defined by and by virtue of **section 2 of the Sea Defence Act** which also incontrovertibly means that by the same **section**, Parcel 917 or a portion thereof is also “**sea defence**”.

It follows that by virtue of **section 12 (1) of the Sea Defence Act**, Parcels 917 and 936 are property of the State.

Counsel for the Defendants contend that **section 12 (1) of the Sea Defence Act** only takes effect after the publication of an order under **section 12 (2) of the Sea Defence Act**.

This is indeed a confounding submission since by their pleadings, the Defendants accept that parcel 936 is the “**sea defence**”.

In any event, the contention is disingenuous, since the order referred to in **section 12 (2) of the Sea Defence Act** is referable to **sections 9 and 10 of the Sea Defence Act** which speaks to the publication of an order by the Minister for the construction of a “**sea defence**”.

Counsel for the Defendants also contend that pursuant to **section 13 of the Sea Defence Act** there ought to have been an annotation on Mark Levy’s Title but this is a duplicitous submission since the “**sea defence**” clearly existed before any Title.

This is clear from the fact that the “**sea defence**” is laid down on Plan No. 15526 [**Exhibit “A”**] from which the Titles, including Mark Levy’s Title, for the area have been derived.

It is clear that construction of the “**sea defence**” referred to as the “*sea defence reserve dam*” in Plan No. 15526 was completed and established prior to the time of the survey, August 1<sup>st</sup> 1972.

The annotation would only be required or be done if the land that is now the “**sea defence**” became the property of the State after the Title was issued, it therefore follows that there could be no annotation on Mark Levy’s Title [**Exhibit “T”**], which was issued June 11<sup>th</sup> 1983, more than a decade after the plan was drawn.

Further consideration of **section 13 of the Sea Defence Act**, must lead to the conclusion that the existence of the “**sea defence**” on the Plan [**Exhibit “A”**] presumptively shows that all that was required to be done under **section 10 of the Sea Defence Act** was done.

This coupled with the fact that the “**sea defence**” has been in existence for decades prior to the commencement of this High Court Action gives rise to a presumption of regularity [*omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium*] and the Defendants did not attempt to lead evidence to show the contrary, rather, they embraced Parcel 936 as being a sea dam.

Further, and specifically with respect to Parcel 917, based on the Judge’s observation on the site visit that more than half of parcel 917 is covered by the waters of the Essequibo River during the medium high tide, coupled with the fact that the Plaintiff, the SND and Joan Straughn all pointed to points in the Essequibo River as being the boundary of Parcel 917 and the fact that the portion that is not now affected by the tide was in fact filled up by the Plaintiff, it is clear that by virtue of **section 4 (1) of the Civil Law Act** that Parcel 917 or a large part of it forms the **foreshore** of Guyana and is therefore State lands.

It must be noted that by virtue of **section 2 (1) of the Civil Law Act**, **section 4 (1) of the Civil Law Act** is deemed to have taken effect from January 1<sup>st</sup> 1917.

Counsel for the Defendants submits that by virtue of **section 4 (7) of the Civil Law Act** even if the land is a foreshore a private right has been established by the titular ownership as evidenced by the Transport [**Exhibit “U1 - U3”**].

Reliance on the Transport cannot be sustained since the Defendants have not established by evidence that the lands described in the Transport are, or form part of Parcel 917.



Therefore the earliest possible titular ownership of Parcel 917 according to the Defendants' evidence is Tyrell Levy's Certificate of Title obtained in 1974.

Notwithstanding this, in any event, the submission cannot be sustained, since, as stated previously the section is deemed to have taken effect from January 1<sup>st</sup> 1917 and therefore any claimed private right would have to have been established as existing prior to 1917 and that was neither pleaded nor established by evidence.

### **CONCLUSION**

Based on the foregoing analysis of the evidence and the law Parcel 917 is State land.

### **ISSUE II**

The Court having made a finding that parcel 917 is State land, what is the status of Mark Levy's Certificate of Title No. 83/ 473 with respect to Parcel 917.

### **LAW**

**Land Registry Act; CAP 5:02** of the Laws of Guyana.

**Section 61** provides;

*Rectification of the register may be ordered by the Court in such manner as the Court thinks fit –*

- (a) where the Court is satisfied that the registration of any person as proprietor of land has been obtained through any error or omission or by reason of any entry procured by fraud or made under a mistake;*
- (b) in any other case where by reason of any error or omission in the register or by reason of any entry procured by fraud or made under a mistake the Court deems it just to rectify the register.*

*Provided that as against a proprietor who has acquired the land bona fide value the Court shall not rectify the register unless such proprietor is privy to the fraud or mistake or has caused or substantially contributed thereto by his act, neglect or default.*

**Section 70 (2) (b)**

**FACTS**

Counsel for the Plaintiff submits that since there was clearly an error in the registration of title to Mark Levy of Parcel 917 since it was State land then the Court has the authority to rectify the Register and by extension Mark Levy's Certificate of Title to exclude Parcel 917 under **section 61 of the Land Registry Act.**

Counsel for the Defendants submitted that Mark Levy was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and therefore his Title is protected by the proviso in **section 61 of the Land Registry Act.**

**ANALYSIS**

The “**sea defence**” [Parcel 936] clearly existed before any Certificate of Title for any Parcels in the area was issued and therefore Parcel 917 is State land in accordance with the Statute as explained in **ISSUE I** above.

This demonstrates that when Tyrell Levy's Transport [**Exhibit “U1 - U3”**] was converted to a Certificate of Title the lands in the Transport [or a portion thereof] were erroneously assigned [parcel] number 917 because it was not possible for him to be granted Title to the foreshore or sea defence of Guyana.

The Defendants opted to not lead any evidence, documentary or otherwise, to show that the lands in the Transport are the same lands now known as parcel 917.

Based on the Court's finding in **ISSUE I** above it is clear that the registration of Tyrell Levy and then Mark Levy as the proprietor of Parcel 917 was obtained through an error. He could not have been registered as the proprietor of State land, especially State land that forms the foreshore and/ or "**sea defence**" of Guyana.

The Defendants did not plead that Mark Levy is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of Parcel 917 nor lead such evidence and cannot now simply submit that as a fact.

In any event the proviso offers protection to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice where the registration was procured by fraud or mistake but not by error as in the case of the entry with respect to Parcel 917.

### **CONCLUSION**

The Court determines that it is just and fit to order and direct that the Register be rectified by removing Parcel 917 from Certificate of Title No. 83/ 473.

### **ISSUE III**

The Defendants contend that the exercise of any acts of ownership by the State over Parcel 936 must be subject to existing public rights as provided for under **section 4 (4) of the Civil Law of Guyana Act.**

### **FACTS**

It is undisputed that Parcel 936 is the "**sea defence**" or as described in Plan No. 15526, a sea defence reserve dam.

No evidence was led to show that Parcel 936 is subject to a public right.

Counsel for the Defendants contends that by the mere fact that Parcel 936 is a sea dam that “runs” out to the public road shows that that is the only way of getting to parcels north of Parcel 936.

## **LAW**

**Civil Law of Guyana Act; CAP 6:01** of the Laws of Guyana.

### **Section 2 (1)**

### **Section 4 (1)**

**Section 4 (4)** provides;

*Except as provided in the two next ensuing subsections all acts of ownership by the State over the lands and minerals aforesaid, and all grants, leases, or licences shall be subject to any existing public rights under the common law of England.*

**Section 4 (5)** provides;

*Whenever the Minister is satisfied that any act of ownership or any grant, lease, or licence of the lands cannot be exercised without a substantial infringement of some public right, a description of the lands and a statement of the purposes for which they are to be used shall be published in the Gazette during a period of six weeks, and the Minister shall thereafter fix a day for the hearing of objections in writing or by counsel to that act, grant, lease, or licence before him and duly consider any objections.*

## **ANALYSIS**

**Section 4 (4) of the Civil Law of Guyana Act** is wholly inapplicable to Parcel 936, since this section is referable to **section 4 (1) of the Civil Law of Guyana Act** which concerns the **foreshore** of Guyana and by no stretch of the imagination or mental gymnastics can Parcel 936 be considered or classified as being part of the **foreshore** of Guyana.

In any event no evidence has been led to show that a public right exists against Parcel 936 and further assuming that Parcel 936 could possibly considered to be foreshore, such public right must be proven to have existed prior to January 1<sup>st</sup> 1917 [**section 2 (1) of the Civil Law of Guyana Act**] and even further it is for the Minister to be satisfied that a public right would be substantially infringed [**section 4 (5) of the Civil Law of Guyana Act**].

There has been no attempt to lead evidence to establish any of this. It appears that Counsel for the Defendants decided to simply throw in that submission.

Counsel for the Defendants contention that the mere fact that the sea dam “runs” to the public road shows that it is a public access dam is illogical and unreasonable since by definition, statutorily and logically, the purpose of (a) sea defence is for protection of the sea coast against the erosive action of the sea/ river and **not** for the purpose of creating a public passageway.

### **CONCLUSION**

The Defendants clearly have not established any standing to challenge the granting of the lease to the Plaintiff with respect to Parcel 936 and further they have not established that they are entitled to any rights to Parcel 936.

In the circumstances the Court makes the following Orders;

- I. The Third Named Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed.
- II. The Court Orders that the Registrar of Lands do rectify the Register kept under the **Land Registry Act; CAP 5:02** by removing Parcel 917; Block VII; Zone Right Bank Essequibo River from Certificate of Title No. 83/ 473 in the name of Mark Levy.
- III. The Court Declares that the Plaintiff is entitled to occupy and possess and is the lawful occupier of Parcels 914, 915, 916, **917** and **936**; Block VII; Zone Right Bank Essequibo River by virtue of being the lawful Lessee in Lease No. A12158, issued by the Government of Guyana on March 31<sup>st</sup> 2006.
- IV. The Court awards the sum of \$500,000.00 as and for damages for trespass to the Plaintiff against the Second Named Defendant.
- V. The Court grants an injunction restraining the Defendants by themselves, their servants and/ or agents from entering upon, remaining on or dealing in any manner with Parcels 914, 915, 916, 917 and 936; Block VII; Zone Right Bank Essequibo River for as long as the Plaintiff is the Lessee of the said properties.
- VI. The Court awards costs to the Plaintiff in the sums of \$75,000.00 against the First Named Defendant, \$200,000.00 against the Second Named Defendant and \$75,000.00 against the Third Named Defendant.

---

Justice N. A. Singh